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INTRODUCTION 
Edward McWhinney* 
It is fitting in a collection of essays in honor of Julius Stone, 
perhaps the greatest living exponent of the Anglo-Saxon School of 
Sociological Jurisprudence, 1 founded by Stone's own great teacher 
and mentor, Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School,2 that 
we should concentrate upon the judicial process, the creative oppor-
tunities for judicial policy-making, and the very real limitations 
upon the Court's exercise of a legislative role in the elaboration of 
the "new" international law of our own particular era of transition 
and rapid change in the World Community. Stone, in his seminal 
writings on Philosophy of Law, 3 was among the first to point out 
and demonstrate in any systematic, scientific-empirical way, the 
limitations of traditional legal logic as applied to the judicial pro-
cess, and the many ambiguities inherent in the conventional legal 
categories4 which open the way for what Cardozo called intersti-
tial judicial legislation.5 Stone has also, because of his commit-
ment to Sociology of Law, always been keenly aware of the sym-
biotic relation between Law and Society-between the formalized 
norms of statutes, court decisions and other positive law texts, as 
written, and the basic societal facts and conditions of the commu-
nity in respect to which that positive law is to operate.6 The 
societal facts necessarily operate to condition and to limit, and if 
not properly taken into account by the official decision-maker, to 
frustrate, the positive law prescriptions, as originally written. This 
is, of course, one of the basic truths of Sociological Jurisprudence 
-the all too frequent gap between the Law-in-Books and the 
Law-in-Action. Stone's lesson, here, was to preach the socio-
ethical limitations to effective legal action.7 This was a counsel of 
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1. As to international law, see Stone, Problems Confronting Sociological Enquiries 
Concerning International Law, 89 RECUEIL DES CouRs 65 (1956). 
2. See, e.g., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1930); R. POUND, 
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942). 
3. See especially Stone's magnum opus, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS 
LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1946) [hereinafter cited as THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION 
OF LAW]. 
4. J. STONE, Fallacies of the Logical Form in Legal Reasoning, THE PROVINCE AND FUNC-
TION OF LAW 149 et. seq. (1946). 
5. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
6. STONE, Law and Society, THE PROVINCE AND FuNCTION OF LAW 391 et. seq. (1946). 
7. Id. at 673 et. seq.; see also Stone, What Price Effectiveness? [1956] PROC. AM. Soc. 
INT'L L. 198. 
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prudence, directed to judicial decision-makers among others, 
about the dangers of trying to jump too far ahead of the society in 
which the decision-makers must operate, lest an overly ambitious 
or premature venture in community policy-making on the part of 
the judges should turn out to be counter-productive and so delay 
or even frustrate altogether the cause of fundamental legal 
change.8 Finally, Stone recognized what Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
has designated as the "roles and missions" in law and the law-
making processes9-that at any particular time and in respect to 
particular social problems, some agencies of government may be 
more suited to community policy-making than other agencies of 
government; and that, as a general principle and especially for the 
more highly politicized problems, the courts may often be rather 
less effective in community problem-solving than the other, more 
overtly and avowedly, political organs of government.1° 
These three (and other) aspects of Julius Stone's work are 
amply developed in the following Festschrift commemorating his 
retirement. The majority of the articles are written by collegues and 
former students of Stone. They include excellent illustrations of 
contemporary European approaches to jurisprudence. This collec-
tion of articles, both European and American, thus constitutes a 
testimony to the immense influence Julius Stone has had upon 
what is, in United Nations terms, fittingly described as the pro-
gressive development of International Law. 
8. Stone, Of the Feasibility of Tasks in Problems Confronting Sociological Enquiries 
Concerning International Law, 89 RECEUIL DES CouRs 65, 138 (1956). 
9. See Freund, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 16 U. CHICAGO L. R. 205, 213 (1959). 
10 .... Courts are not equipped to pursue the paths for discovering wise policy. A 
court is confined within the bounds of a particular record and it cannot even shape 
the record. Only fragments of a social problem are seen through the narrow windows 
of a litigation. Had we innate or acquired understanding of a social prrJblem in its 
entirety, we would not have at our disposal adequate means for constructive solution. 
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 365-6 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting opinion). 
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